Assuring the Future of Tibet Act of 2026

This Act may be cited as the “Assuring the Future of Tibet Act of 2026”.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The relationship between the United States Government and Tibet began in 1908, when United States diplomat William Rockhill met the 13th Dalai Lama.

(2) The relationship deepened over the twentieth century, including President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1942 outreach to the 14th Dalai Lama, the Dalai Lama’s first visit to Capitol Hill in 1979 and presentation of his Five Point Peace Plan to Congress in 1987, and the first meeting between a sitting United States President and the Dalai Lama in 1991.

(3) The Dalai Lama in 1950 assumed the role of head of state of Tibet. Following his flight into exile in 1959, he continued to serve as the formal head of the Tibetan government-in-exile, later known as the Central Tibetan Administration, and in 2011 transferred his political authority to that government, whose executive and legislative officials are chosen by democratic election and which vests executive power in the Sikyong, the chief executive, pursuant to an amendment to the Tibetan Charter adopted by the Tibetan parliament-in-exile.

(4) It has been the long-standing policy of the United States to promote the internationally recognized human rights and distinct religious, cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan people, as acknowledged and codified by the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 (subtitle E of title III of division FF of Public Law 116–260; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

(5) The Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act (Public Law 118–70) characterizes the dispute between Tibet and the People’s Republic of China as unresolved, states the sense of Congress that “claims made by the People's Republic of China that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times are historically inaccurate,” and states that it is United States policy to resolve the dispute “in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Charter, by peaceful means, through dialogue without preconditions”.

(6) Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the United States ratified in 1992, states, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”.

(7) The People’s Republic of China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress approved by the National People’s Congress in March 2026 contradicts previous statutory and constitutional guarantees of meaningful autonomy for Tibetans and other non-Han Chinese populations by statutorily mandating that education be conducted in Mandarin, mandating that written Chinese be given prominence over alternative scripts in public settings, and legally prioritizing national identity over distinct ethnic identity.

(8) The Government of the People’s Republic of China has provided no verifiable evidence that the Tibetan people were consulted on, much less approved, the diminution of their right to autonomy under the People’s Republic of China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China has reneged on its legal commitment under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and relevant international law to provide a high degree of regional autonomy to the Tibetan people, including the right to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, through the enactment in 2026 of the People’s Republic of China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which instead facilitates the assimilation of Tibetans and erosion of the right of the Tibetan people to exercise their religious, cultural, and language rights;

(2) the People’s Republic of China has denied the Tibetan people the ability to exercise their right to self-determination as provided by international law;

(3) the United States has expressed support for the Dalai Lama’s vision of a negotiated agreement through dialogue without preconditions between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives or democratically elected leaders of the Tibetan community as one means of allowing the Tibetan people to exercise their right to self-determination;

(4) the Government of the People’s Republic of China has not demonstrated sincerity or seriousness in its approach to engaging in meaningful dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives or to reach a negotiated resolution that includes the aspirations of the Tibetan people;

(5) the Gaden Phodrang Trust serves as the legitimate and sole authority to identify and recognize Dalai Lamas; and

(6) the Central Tibetan Administration is the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to affirm the commitment of the United States to a resolution of the dispute between Tibet and the People’s Republic of China as a matter of strategic interest to the United States;

(2) to encourage the Government of the People’s Republic of China to address the aspirations of the Tibetan people with regard to their distinct historical, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity;

(3) to support the Tibetan people’s free exercise of their internationally recognized human rights, including the right to self-determination;

(4) that the Central Tibetan Administration represents continuity of governance of the Tibetan people as established by the Dalai Lama; and

(5) to support the Central Tibetan Administration in its effort to carry out the responsibilities for which it has been empowered by the Dalai Lama and legitimized by the Tibetan people through their exercise of a genuine democratic process.

In order to carry out the policy under section 4—

(1) the President should direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to advocate for the Central Tibetan Administration’s observer status within the United Nations General Assembly and relevant agencies of the United Nations; and

(2) the Secretary of State should—

(A) advocate for the inclusion of the Central Tibetan Administration in relevant international bodies and groupings;

(B) organize like-minded partners to support greater international recognition of the Central Tibetan Administration within bodies of the United Nations and other multilateral fora; and

(C) ensure the Central Tibetan Administration has equal access and opportunity to participate across the United Nations system, including in specialized and technical bodies of strategic importance, funds, entities, and other bodies as appropriate.

In order to carry out the policy under section 4, the Secretary of State or their designee shall—

(1) lead interagency efforts to directly engage at the most senior levels with Central Tibetan Administration officials, including the Sikyong and the designated representatives of the Sikyong;

(2) take steps to ensure the Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration is extended appropriate diplomatic courtesies, including the provision of appropriate security details during visits to the United States;

(3) consider the applicability of diplomatic privileges and immunities to officials of the Central Tibetan Administration; and

(4) urge partners and allies of the United States to engage with and support the Central Tibetan Administration at senior levels.

(a) In general.— Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for ten years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that describes the steps taken to implement section 5 and section 6.

(b) Consolidation.— After the issuance of the first report required under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to incorporate subsequent reports under such subsection into other publicly available annual reports produced by the Department of State, provided they are submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives in a manner specifying that they are being submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of this Act.