Assuring the Future of Tibet Act of 2026

This Act may be cited as the “Assuring the Future of Tibet Act of 2026”.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The relationship between the United States Government and Tibet began in 1908, when United States diplomat William Rockhill met the 13th Dalai Lama to discuss Tibet’s relations with China and Great Britain and facilitate an exchange of gifts between the Dalai Lama and United States President Theodore Roosevelt.

(2) The relationship of the United States Government with His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama began in 1942 when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt wrote him to state, “There are in the United States of America, many persons, among them myself, who [are] long and greatly interested in your land and people . . .”.

(3) The relationship of the United States Congress with the 14th Dalai Lama began in 1979 when he first visited Capitol Hill and strengthened in 1987 when he presented his Five Point Peace Plan to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in the United States Capitol building.

(4) The first face-to-face meeting between Presidents of the United States and the Dalai Lama began in 1991 when President George H.W. Bush hosted him at the White House.

(5) Engagement between the United States Government and the Central Tibetan Administration and members of Tibetan communities has grown and deepened in recent decades to include diverse programming to support health, education, humanitarian aid, governance, people-to-people exchanges, as authorized in the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note), and dialogue on global matters of mutual interest.

(6) The Dalai Lama in 1950 assumed the role of head of state of Tibet.

(7) The Dalai Lama continued to serve as the formal head of the Tibetan government-in-exile, later known as the Central Tibetan Administration, after 1959.

(8) In 2011, the Dalai Lama transferred his political authority to the Tibetan government-in-exile, whose executive and legislative officials are chosen by democratic election, a decision that was codified by the Tibetan parliament-in-exile through an amendment to the Tibetan Charter vesting executive power of the Central Tibetan Administration in the Sikyong, the chief executive.

(9) In 2011, and reaffirmed in 2025, the Dalai Lama announced that the determination of his successor will be made by the Gaden Phodrang Trust, the Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, which has “sole authority to recognize the future reincarnation; no one else has any such authority to interfere in this matter”.

(10) The next Dalai Lama, who will be selected according to the process set by the 14th Dalai Lama, will not come of majority age for many years after being selected.

(11) It has been the long-standing policy of the United States to promote the human rights and distinct religious, cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan people, as acknowledged and codified by the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

(12) The Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Dispute Act (Public Law 118–70) characterizes the dispute between Tibet and the People’s Republic of China as unresolved, states the sense of Congress that “claims made by the People's Republic of China that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times are historically inaccurate”, and states that it is United States policy to resolve the dispute “in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Charter, by peaceful means, through dialogue without preconditions”.

(13) Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provide, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.

(14) The People’s Republic of China’s constitution and the People’s Republic of China’s Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of 1984 provide for a right of regional autonomy for Tibetans and other non-Han Chinese populations, including “the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages” and maintain or change their own cultural practices.

(15) The People’s Republic of China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress approved by the National People’s Congress in March 2026 contradicts previous statutory and constitutional guarantees of meaningful autonomy for Tibetans and other non-Han Chinese populations by statutorily mandating that education be conducted in Mandarin, requiring that written Chinese be given prominence over alternative scripts in public settings, and legally prioritizing national identity over distinct ethnic identity.

(16) The Government of the People’s Republic of China has provided no verifiable evidence that the Tibetan people were consulted, much less approved, the diminution of their right to autonomy under the People’s Republic of China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the Government of the People’s Republic of China has reneged on its legal commitment under the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, and relevant international law to provide a high degree of regional autonomy to the Tibetan people, including the right to use and develop their own spoken and written languages, through the enactment in 2026 of the People’s Republic of China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which instead facilitates the assimilation of Tibetans and erosion of the right of the Tibetan people to exercise their own religious, cultural and language rights;

(2) the People’s Republic of China has denied the Tibetan people the ability to exercise their right to self-determination as provided by international law;

(3) the United States has expressed support for the Dalai Lama’s vision of a negotiated agreement through dialogue without preconditions between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives or democratically elected leaders of the Tibetan community as one means of allowing the Tibetan people to exercise their right to self-determination;

(4) the Government of the People’s Republic of China has not demonstrated sincerity or seriousness in its approach to engaging in meaningful dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives or to reach a negotiated resolution that includes the aspirations of the Tibetan people;

(5) the Gaden Phodrang Trust serves as the legitimate and sole authority to identify and recognize Dalai Lamas; and

(6) the Central Tibetan Administration is the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to affirm the commitment of the United States to a resolution of the dispute between Tibet and the People’s Republic of China as a matter of strategic interest to the United States;

(2) to support the Tibetan people’s free exercise of their fundamental and universal human rights under international law, including the right to self-determination as provided by Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;

(3) to maintain engagement with the Tibetan people directly and through their democratically elected leadership and through their religious and cultural leaders in order to promote their aspirations with regard to their distinct historical, cultural, religious, and linguistic identity;

(4) that the Central Tibetan Administration represents continuity of governance of the Tibetan people as established by the Dalai Lama; and

(5) to support the Central Tibetan Administration in its effort to carry out the responsibilities for which it has been empowered by the Dalai Lama and legitimized by the Tibetan people through their exercise of a genuine democratic process.

In order to carry out the policy under section 4—

(1) the President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to advocate for the Central Tibetan Administration’s observer status within the United Nations General Assembly and relevant agencies of the United Nations; and

(2) the Secretary of State shall—

(A) advocate for the inclusion of the Central Tibetan Administration in relevant international bodies and groupings; and

(B) organize like-minded partners to support greater international recognition of the Central Tibetan Administration within bodies of the United Nations and other multilateral fora.

In order to carry out the policy under section 4, Secretary of State shall—

(1) lead interagency efforts to directly engage at the most senior levels with Central Tibetan Administration officials, including the Sikyong and the designated representatives of the Sikyong;

(2) take steps to ensure the Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration is extended appropriate diplomatic courtesies, including the provision of appropriate security details during visits to the United States consistent with a head of government;

(3) consider the applicability of diplomatic privileges and immunities to officials of the Central Tibetan Administration; and

(4) urge partners and allies of the United States to engage with and support the Central Tibetan Administration at similarly senior levels.

Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report that describes the status of the implementation of section 5 and section 6.